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Abstract: 
Tanzania’s endowment of diverse biodiversity, wildlife resources and prime natural 
attraction sites put the country at the center of many debates about conservation, human 
welfare and development. As approaches for wildlife protection have evolved over time, 
so has the need for redressing the gap between nature and people through different 
kinds of partnerships. Based on are view of the existing literature, we examine the context 
in which partnerships have emerged in the wildlife sector in Tanzania, the processes that 
support acquisition and maintenance of legitimacy, as well as the sustainability outcomes 
of these partnerships. Specifically, the paper examines the historical trajectory of these 
partnerships and the influence that different actors have historically maintained hence 
determining how the public and private sector engagements evolved over time. We draw 
insights from the Selous game reserve with specific attention to the role of Wildlife 
Management Areas (WMAs) as a converging point for many actors. The paper suggests 
that partnerships for wildlife protection have increased in number and scope. However, 
the assessment of their impacts has mainly focused on how much land has been secured 
for the protection of wildlife. Livelihood impacts of these partnerships have been largely 
assessed against the background of unequal terms of local community engagement with 
private investors, recentralization, the rise of local elites, corruption and the limitations 
that they place on local land use. We suggest that documenting how partnerships are 
formed, their different configurations and impacts should be an important step towards 
the analysis of the relations of power among different actors and with local communities, 
as well as a nuanced understanding of their ecological and livelihood outcomes.  
 
Key words: Sustainability, partnerships, Wildlife Management Areas, Selous game 
reserve, Tanzania 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper provides the context in which partnerships have emerged in Tanzania’s wildlife 
sector. It unpacks what these partnerships entail, the main actors behind their 
establishment and how they influence outcomes of different conservation and 
development initiatives. The paper is based on the review of literature with particular 
interest on recent sector reforms that have created conditions for the emergence of 
different kinds of partnerships. While we consider these partnerships as the result of 
decentralization of natural resources across developing countries, we use the Selous 
game reserve as a case study to illustrate some of their key features and dynamics. In the 
second section of the paper, we present the trajectory of partnerships in the wildlife 
sector in general and its manifestations in the Selous ecosystem. The third section 
examines how different and powerful global actors converged their interests to support 
construction of the Selous ecosystem as a landscape that is currently considered the 
largest game reserve in Africa. In the fourth section, we assess the role of different actors, 
particularly in supporting decentralization, which created the supporting legal and 
institutional framework for the establishment and functioning of WMAs as a form of 
partnership. The fifth and final section presents a critical review of socio-economic and 
ecological impacts of WMAs so far, with specific emphasis on the livelihoods of local 
communities. 
 
 
2.The trajectory of wildlife conservation partnerships in Tanzania 
 
In 2003, the Journal of Parks designated volume 13(1) specifically for conservation 
partnerships in Africa. Being the brainchild of the World Commission on Protected Areas 
(WCPA) of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the focus on conservation partnerships 
in early 2003 was in the lead-up to the World Parks Congress in Durban in September of 
the same year. Six case studies in this volume dealt with partnership arrangements where 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of natural resources were a common thread. 
The term ‘partnership’ was loosely used to imply a collective, voluntary process and state 
of affairs by which a number of partners fairly shared the functions, rights and 
responsibilities for the conservation of a protected area and/or related territories and 
resources (Borrini-Feyerabend and Sandwith, 2003). It is noted that this understanding of 
partnership is far from idealized and can merely represent a complex interplay of interests. 
For the purpose of the initial discussions, however, it was fundamental in spelling out the 
broad understanding that sustaining conservation in Africa would require support of a 
variety of actors in society.  
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The literature on wildlife conservation partnerships in Africa is relatively new. However, 
conditions for the materialization of partnerships were created and embedded in colonial 
transitional strategies towards the independent Africa. Among other things, these 
conditions were to create continuity of influence and control by external actors on Africa’s 
wildlife (Gißibl, 2006). In Tanzania, this control and influence is entrenched in the famous 
Arusha Conservation Manifesto, the first post-colonial conservation commitment that 
continues to shape how bilateral development partners and international conservation 
organizations determine conservation priorities for the country’s vast natural resources. 
This historical commitment is important to bring forth in the discussions of the 
contemporary partnership configurations and impacts. 
 
The need for partnership in Tanzania’s wildlife protection was demonstrated through the 
case of the Selous game reserve (SGR) for which Baldus et al., (2003) called for a multi-
donor approach in protecting the landscape and its unique wildlife diversity. A detailed 
discussion of this case and how it shapes our conceptualization of conservation 
partnerships elsewhere in the country will follow later in the paper. For now, it suffices to 
point out that after two decades of the publication of conservation partnerships in Africa 
and the World Parks Congress, the questions that emerged from the selected cases 
remain relevant for our discussion today. However, instead of asking who possesses a 
social legitimacy to participate in managing the protected area and related natural 
resources (the overarching question of 2003), we examine the context in which 
partnerships have eventually emerged, the processes that support the acquisition and 
maintenance of legitimacy, as well as the sustainability outcomes of different emergent 
configurations. Our inquiry is against the background of two decades of nurturing these 
partnerships through state, local and international NGOs, community and private sector 
involvement in Tanzania’s wildlife sector.  
 
In September 1961 – three months before the independence of Tanzania – a conference 
officially titled Pan-African Symposium of Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
in Modern African States was held in Arusha. The conference followed a report of inquiry1 
that led to the establishment of the African Special Project (ASP) (World Conservation 
Union (IUCN), 1963, Riney, 1970). The inquiry team worked from 1960 to 1963 by touring 
in almost all states in Africa south of the Sahara to discuss, with new and would be African 
leaders, the principles and practices of conservation. Whereas the report of this inquiry 
																																																						
1The report was compiled by long serving African-based scientists, such as Prof. Julian Huxley (also the first director of 
UNESCO) and Mr. Gerald Watterson (the IUCN general secretary) (IUCN, 1963). 
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informed the Arusha conference, previous analyses have questioned the timing, motives 
of the conference organizers and the commitments made therein. It is argued that the 
inquiry report and the conference marked the peak of the conservation mission and the 
beginning of decolonizing nature in Africa (McCormick, 1989, Neumann, 1998, McShane, 
2003).  
While the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) 
and IUCN were jointly responsible for the preparation of the Arusha conference, the 
American Conservation Association, Deutsche Afrika-Gesellsehaft, the Fauna 
Preservation Society, the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland and UNESCO funded 
the participation of delegates from different parts of the world – about hundred and forty 
participants who represented African and non-African governments as well as 
international organizations (Noe, 2009). Among the top officials of the Tanzanian 
transitional government (then called Tanganyika) attending the conference was the then 
Prime Minister Mwalimu J.K Nyerere (Watterson, 1961). 
 
The Tanganyika Governor Richard Turnbull presented the nature protection agenda 
under three main themes: (1) that wildlife and wild nature were an undoubted source of 
revenue needed for social services, and must therefore be rationally exploited as it is the 
best form of land use; (2) the public opinion, whose support was essential, must be 
convinced of the value of this heritage; and (3) the international aid would be needed if 
the world in general wished to see Africa's unique fauna preserved in Africa for the 
benefit of humankind (IUCN, 1963). The culmination of the Arusha conference was the 
Manifesto, which was presented by the Prime Minister Mwalimu Nyerere. Indeed, an 
extract of the Arusha Manifesto as presented below echo legitimacy issues that the 
colonial government and conservationists wished to maintain: 
 
 
The survival of our wildlife is a matter of grave concern to all of us in Africa. These wild 
creatures amid the wild places they inhabit are not only important as a source of 
wonder and inspirations but are an integral part of our natural resources and of our 
future livelihood and well-being. In accepting the trusteeship of our wildlife, we 
solemnly declare that we will do everything in our power to make sure that our 
children’s grandchildren will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance. The 
conservation of wildlife and wild places calls for specialist knowledge, trained 
manpower, and money. We look to other nations to co-operate with us in this 
important task, the success or failure of which not only affects the continent of Africa 
but the rest of the world as well (cited in Watterson, 1961:4).  
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Through this manifesto, the Western influence over African wildlife was maintained over 
the newly independent government. Partnerships were tied to donor funds, which 
continued to support the presence of international development agencies and NGOs as 
well as bilateral institutions (Neumann, 1998, Kideghesho, 2006). As Bonner (1993) 
records, ‘the Arusha Manifesto was written by Europeans, including Max Nicholson, 
founding member of WWF, and Ian MacPhail, an advertising executive hired by WWF’ (p. 
65).  
Notwithstanding its origins, the manifesto served as a mantra that guided wildlife 
conservation in Tanzania before the enactment of the Wildlife Policy (1998). Its 
philosophy has been widely used by donors, conservationists and researchers to hold the 
government to its conservation commitment. Recently, the headquarters of Tanzania 
National Parks (TANAPA) in Arusha was named after the late Mwalimu J.K Nyerere, and 
the Arusha Manifesto is inscribed in his statue which is placed at the center of the entrance 
lounge. At the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, the manifesto features in first 
pages of wildlife policies and strategies, and the text remains the basis of the 
government’s conservation commitments (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1998, 
TANAPA, 2009).  
As Ponte et al., (2017) demonstrates, the contemporary partnerships that we study in the 
NEPSUS project is new in their context and process. Specifically, sustainability 
partnerships are taking shape as contexts of, and narratives about, resource depletion 
are changing – bringing new international audiences, alliances and policies to bear on 
previously local and national issues (Ponte et al., 2017). This implies that we must 
understand complexity in sustainability partnerships and how it may shape sustainability 
outcomes. Accordingly, NEPSUS examines whether and how different configurations of 
partnerships complexity lead to successful and more equitable outcomes, or to increased 
conflict and failure. This paper put partnerships in the wildlife sector in the overall context 
of the project urging further that, new partnerships have their genesis from the country’s 
colonial history of external influence in matters relating to wildlife. In our view, this history 
matter because it determines how various (old and new) partners have acquired and 
maintained legitimacy in the country’s conservation policy and practices.  
 
 
3.The Selous ecosystem: Crisis narrative and conservation partnerships 
 
Tanzania’s wildlife protected areas alone covers 26% of the country’s land surface with 15 
national parks, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, 28 game reserves and about 33 
Game Controlled Areas (GCA) and/or Wildlife Management Areas (WMA). The latter 
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category was only formally designated in mid2000s and covers about 5% of the total 
wildlife protected areas (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 2015). This protected area network is subsumed within six 
ecosystems across the country: the large Selous ecosystem, Tarangire-Manyara, 
Serengeti, Katavi-Rukwa, Moyowosi-Kigosiand-Ruaha-Rungwa. The Selous ecosystem 
and its surroundings is an internationally significant area (hence, it has been a World 
Heritage Site since 1982). Its fame is connected to being the first and oldest reserve in 
Africa (since 1905); constituting the largest remaining elephant wilderness in the world 
(which is equivalent to the size of Switzerland); and being considered the best hunting 
destination in Africa (Baldus, 2001, Neumann, 2001). This ecosystem harbors about 60% 
of Tanzania’s elephant population (Baldus and Hahn, 2004).  
In terms of landscape ecology, the Selous ecosystem covers 90,000 km2and includes the 
surrounding national parks of Ruaha and Mikumi, and several forest reserves, WMAs and 
open areas. Both WMAs and open areas are ‘unoccupied’ village lands adjacent to 
protected or conserved sites that are usually used by wildlife seasonally or throughout 
the year. As elsewhere in the country, connectivity of this ecosystem has been constructed 
through several WMAs such that the landscape is functionally linked with the42,000 
km2of Niassa game reserve in Mozambique (Noe, 2010). This connection scales up the 
ecosystem to a transfrontier conservation area, for which a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed in 2007 between the governments of Tanzania and 
Mozambique.  
 
Owing to its fame, the Selous game reserve has historically attracted many conservation 
and business partnerships, with the latter evoking narratives of environmental destruction 
hence calling for the participation of an increasing number of actors and actor categories. 
For example, in the mid-1980s, the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), a German NGO, 
claimed that the Selous reserve was in danger of losing its rhino and elephant populations 
and that, as a matter of urgency, Tanzania was required to approach the international 
community for assistance (Stephenson 1987). The Federal Republic of Germany 
responded in the same year, putting the SGR in its official development cooperation with 
the government of Tanzania. That same year, the Selous Conservation Program (SCP) was 
established as a partnership comprising Tanzania’s Wildlife Division and Germany 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Other partners such as Belgium Technical Cooperation 
(BTC) joined the mission with specific interest in supporting conservation activities in the 
eastern parts of the reserve. 
For the first time, the GTZ/SCP and BTC-Eastern Selous programmes introduced 
community-based conservation in village lands around the reserve. By the year 2000, 
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about 51 villages in seven districts around the reserve had been involved in the 
conversion of village lands into some sort of wildlife buffer zones (GTZ, 1998, Baldus, 
2008). These programmes significantly influenced the content of the first wildlife policy 
(1998), which became the cornerstone for the adoption of village wildlife areas known 
today as WMAs. 
 
However, several crises emerged in recent years and have made Selous infamous in 
conservation cycles. These include threats to the reserve’s ecology from ongoing 
industrial projects – including uranium, oil and gas exploration, as well as the Stigler’s 
electricity generation project. The ecosystem has recently been the hotspot for poaching 
(UNESCO, 2015, WWF, 2016).Recent reports suggest that the Selous elephant 
population could disappear within six years if urgent measures are not taken to stop 
industrial-scale poaching (WWF, 2016). It is estimated that between 2009 and 2014, the 
population of approximately 45,000 elephants has declined to approximately 15,000 
(URT, 2016). Due to these threats, the Selous game reserve was inscribed in the List of 
World Heritage Sites in Danger (IUCN, 2017).This called for more commitments to 
protect wildlife. As the following passage suggests, recent calls for partnership 
correspond closely with the country’s historical conservation mantra – the Arusha 
Manifesto – that had pledged for international assistance in wildlife protection: 
 
In light of huge challenges facing the Selous Game Reserve like poaching, 
encroachment and poverty in its buffer zones, but also in light of the significance of this 
magnificent and unique ecosystem of global importance, the German government is 
committed to supporting the Tanzanian government in protecting the Selous Game 
Reserve for the benefit of present mankind and future generations’ Egon Kochanke, 
German Ambassador to Tanzania (17 June 2017). 
 
This was the open statement of the joint press release at the launch of the Selous 
Ecosystem Conservation and Development Program (SECAD) in 2017. In the MoU, the 
German government announced the provision of €18 million for SECAD, to be 
implemented over a five-year time frame. Other co-financing and implementing partners, 
FZS and WWF committed approximately €400,000. As a powerful actor with involvement 
since the early times of SCP (URT, 2016), FZS is responsible for SECAD’s activities inside 
the game reserve in relation to supporting law enforcement, key species protection 
initiatives and ecological monitoring. WWF will advise the reserve management on 
outreach and community conservation, thus leading activities that are focused on the 
sustainable management of resources in priority areas around the reserve. According to 
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the joint release, an [unidentified] international implementing consultant will support SGR 
in the provision of priority infrastructure and equipment (URT, 2017a) 
Beyond SECAD and its partners, there are other ongoing conservation commitments in 
and around the reserve. For example, Germany committed €100 million since 2012 for 
biodiversity protection and rural development in Tanzania. Out of these, €18 million were 
set aside for the rehabilitation of the SGR and its surroundings. Different German 
development agencies including FZS, KfW and GIZ are directly involved in the 
implementation of activities funded by these commitments.  In a different joint press 
release of 31 March 2016, the Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Gerd Müller, provided funding for the acquisition 
of two Husky A-1C Aircraft to support the Tanzanian wildlife authorities in countering the 
poaching threat and monitoring wildlife and habitats. One of these aircraft was to join an 
earlier one that operates specifically in Selous under FSZ (URT, 31 March 2016). Hence, 
FZS operates the two aircraft for monitoring and logistics in addition to the provision of 
support for the maintenance of the Selous vehicle fleet. 
Clearly, the German government has been historically a prominent bilateral partner with 
several of its agencies implementing different activities. However, other donors and 
international conservation NGOs (such as BTC, WWF, IUCN, UNESCO) have maintained 
strong connections to the SGR. Their activities in and around the reserve reconfigure local 
land use, natural resource institutions and relations. As such, these actors make WMAs 
(and village lands) a complex site for interrogating the newly emerging partnerships for 
wildlife protection. Against this background, we consider WMAs as both a product of the 
existing partnerships and a form of partnership that is characterized by a very complex 
network of actors who assume and maintain different roles and interests in wildlife. This 
complexity relates to the ecological importance of the SGR, which attracts the attention 
of powerful actors, but also to the WMA form, which dictates the nesting of local 
resources and their institutions into some sort of partnerships (between villages, with the 
game reserve/central government and with external conservation proponents). In the 
next section, we put into perspective the policy and legal environment through which 
different actors managed to converge their interests and actions that have significantly 
shaped access and control of land and its resources by the local communities. 
 
 
4. Decentralizing the wildlife sector: legal and institutional framework 
Responding to higher rates of wildlife poaching incidences in the late 1980s, the 
government of Tanzania, together with development partners, carried out major reforms 
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in the wildlife sector in the late 1990s (Nelson and Blomley, 2006, Nelson, 2012, Sulle and 
Banka, Forthcoming). Among other things, these reforms introduced the first Wildlife 
Policy of Tanzania (WPT), 1998, which formalized local community participation in the 
management, control and sharing of benefits from wildlife and other resources found 
within village lands (URT, 1998, Nelson and Blomley, 2006, URT, 2014a). In 2007, this 
policy was revised to recognize District Councils as responsible institutions for 
formulating and enforcing bylaws, providing technical support and conservation 
education to villages as well as preparing physical and development plans that protect 
wetlands and wildlife (URT 2007: Section 3.1.2). This policy further recognize villagers and 
private landholders as the key stakeholders who are bearing the costs of property 
damage by marauding animals and foregoing other social and cultural benefits (URT, 
2007: Section 3.2.4 d). 
 
These policy statements provide solid ground for villagers and district councils’ claims to 
have a large stake in conservation efforts and benefits. However, this has been one of the 
sources of struggle between local and the central government with the later maintaining 
its control and powers over the management of wildlife resources found in local 
jurisdictions. This is because; first, all wildlife is legally the property of the state making all 
activities pertaining to wildlife be authorized by the Director of Wildlife. Second, the 
district authorities are required by law support development and awareness in their 
jurisdiction (URT, 1982). This contradiction causes two opposing forces because district 
authorities have mandates for their development activities but not those to utilize 
resources to cater for the required financial and human resources. Nevertheless, reforms 
that occurred throughout 1990s were deemed necessary because policing of wildlife by 
the central government was no longer effective, and a collaborative model that would 
include local communities was regarded as essential. 
 
The long-term goals of reforms in the wildlife sector targeted the improvement of the 
tourism industry. These interventions were meant to reverse the long-term decline in 
wildlife populations and ecosystems through increased engagement of key actors, and 
especially local communities, in the protection of wildlife. Consequently, conservation 
and tourism activities are administered at two levels of the government: the central 
government (i.e. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT)) and the local 
government (i.e. the district council and its local authorities which include village councils 
and wildlife authorized associations) (Figure 1). The Ministry is responsible for policy 
formulation and overall administration and coordination of all activities related to the 
development of wildlife and tourism in the country. As indicated further in Appendix 1, 
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the Ministry uses several policies, legal and institutional frameworks to govern wildlife 
and tourism activities occurring in protected areas and village lands that support wildlife.   
 
Governance reforms that shaped the institutional structure in Figure 1 were implemented 
at the same time as the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s 
(Nelson et al., 2007, Noe and Kangalawe, 2015) which was expected to have two distinct 
outcomes in the wildlife sector. First, to increase domestic and foreign direct investment 
in wildlife tourism and, second, to cut down the costs of running the sector by eliminating 
redundant programs in various government agencies (Teskey and Hooper, 1999). The 
results of these interventions are yet to be fully realized mainly because several policies, 
legal and institutional frameworks have either been partially reformed or re-adjusted to 
institute more state control over natural resources that were previously sought to be 
decentralized (Benjaminsen et al., 2013, Ramutsindela and Noe, 2015, Wright, 2017). As 
such, there has been a continuous institutional struggle over who should control what 
resources in wildlife areas, especially those involving WMAs and/or open areas that are 
found in village lands. 
 
Figure 1: The Institutional Structure of Wildlife Governance in Tanzania 
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Different studies provide reasons for the inadequacy of these reforms, including low 
capacity and lack of resources with which to address complex landscape management 
issues, the state’s continued control of wildlife revenues (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008), lack 
of transparency and accountability in revenue collection and sharing (Brockington, 2008, 
Wright, 2017), and lack of meaningful participation and empowerment of local 
communities (Mariki et al., 2015, Noe and Kangalawe, 2015). As a result, community 
participation in the wildlife sector either generates only limited benefits to rural livelihood 
or presents significant opportunity costs for local communities, further exacerbating land 
use and other natural resource use conflicts (Mariki et al., 2015, Bluwstein et al., 2016, 
Wright, 2017). This issue is at the heart of our current research because, as Nelson et al., 
(2007: 234) summarize: 
 
‘the institutional reform of wildlife management in Tanzania as a response to 
changing policy, new narratives, and practical challenges in rural landscapes has 
proven to be fraught with tension and inconsistency. Conflicts over land and 
resource rights in areas where wildlife populations occur alongside local people 
have grown among government agencies, rural communities and private interests.’ 
 
 
5. Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs): An outcome of decentralization and a 
form of partnership 
 
We make reference to WMAs ‘as an outcome because these areas emerged from a 
constellation of different actor’s diverse interests that converged to support policy and 
practices leading to a new conservation category in village lands. Through their financial 
and technical contributions, these actors have also participated directly in fostering 
partnerships between villages (that form WMAs) and between WMAs to establish wildlife 
corridors across borders. In doing so, these actors establish a local conservation scale 
necessary for the construction of conservation landscapes (Ramutsindela and Noe, 2015). 
WMAs are themselves a form of partnership between villages, protected area 
management and private sector actors who are involved in conservation business. In 
particular, local communities find themselves in this form of partnership by the sheer 
presence of protected areas in their neighborhood and by owning land that is considered 
valuable for wildlife.  
 
Since wild animals do not recognize borders, their dispersal, rather than political 
jurisdictions, dictates conservation requirements. While this remains an ecological view, 
it renders village administrative borders immaterial hence requiring that villages agree to 
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put their land together and share responsibilities for wildlife protection. In addition, 
WMAs are brought into another level of partnership through an Authorized Association 
Consortium, a national level umbrella organization responsible for capacity building, 
marketing as well as bridging communities with the government, private investors and 
donors. In practice, this has meant that village lands are made available for the 
establishment of legal wildlife land use while at the same time creating buffer zones and 
wildlife corridors. Countrywide, there are 38 WMAs at different stages of development, 
of which 17 WMAs have attained AA status. Out of these, ten WMAs have been 
established in the wider Selous ecosystem (see Table 1). Their management plans include 
explicit interventions and activities that would strengthen the conservation of each of 
these areas and the reserve.  
 
Conservation proponents have hailed WMAs as both a conservation tool and a legal 
mechanism for communities to benefit from their involvement in wildlife protection (WWF, 
2014, Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative (NTRI), 2016). Benefits are projected in the 
form of revenues, employment, sales of goods, and other activities connected with 
tourism or trophy hunting. To generate benefits, WMAs that have registered Authorized 
Associations (AAs) (the governing body for WMAs) enter into joint ventures or concession 
agreements with tourism or trophy hunting companies – with the approval required from 
the Director of Wildlife. However, the procedures under the current WMA regulations 
(2012) require that the investors pay their fees directly to the Wildlife Division, with a 
proportion of wildlife income returned to the AAs following an agreed distribution 
formula. 
 
Table 1: WMAs that form buffer zones and wildlife corridors in the Selous ecosystem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Name of WMA Main funding partners Area 
(km2) 
1 LIWALE BTC 4,515  
2 MUNGATA GTZ, WWF 762  
3 UKUTU GTZ 639  
4 ILUMA GTZ 511  
5 MBARANG’ANDU GTZ 2,318  
6 NALIKA GEF/UNDP, GTZ, KfW, InWent, 1,391  
7 CHINGOLI GEF/UNDP, GTZ, KfW, InWent, 938  
8 KISUNGULE GEF/UNDP, GTZ, KfW, InWent, 1,345  
9 KINDAMBA GEF/UNDP, GTZ, KfW, InWent, 2,150  
10 JUHIWANGUMWA BTC 496.5 
 Total area under WMAs 15,066 
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6. Tourism-specific issues in WMAs 
The world-class natural and cultural assets of the northern circuit that includes 
destinations like Ngorongoro conservation area, the Kilimanjaro Mountain and national 
parks such as Serengeti, Manyara, Tarangire and Arusha have mostly driven tourism 
growth in Tanzania. Following the concentration of national parks in the north, 
photographic tourism and their related economic multiplier effects are clustered in 
Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions. These regions account for the second highest 
concentration of accommodations, rooms, beds, and employees after Dar es Salaam. The 
tourism sector of Tanzania is still predominantly wildlife-based. The sector has a strong 
asset base (maybe one of the strongest in the region) but a weak tourism and institutional 
setup, which limits the generation, collection and distribution of benefits. Especially in 
relation to Southern Tanzania, the development of tourism businesses is constrained by 
issues related to security of tenure for investments in protected areas, infrastructure 
within tourist attractions, access by air, availability of skilled local labour and viable tourist 
products. Nevertheless, the contribution of tourism to the economy is significant. 
According to the Sector Report of 2014, tourism alone generated $2 billion in revenue, 
or 25% of total foreign exchange earnings and 17% of GDP (URT, 2014b). A recent 
SafariBookings analysis indicates that tourists and Africa experts voted Tanzania the best 
2017 safari country in Africa (URT, 2017b).  
While most of the tourism revenues are generated from activities that take place within 
national parks and game reserves, in recent years WMAs have contributed to these 
revenues through public-private partnerships and joint-venture investments. The 2012 
WMAs guidelines provide for the partnership between investors and AAs. These legal 
provisions have facilitated the establishment of a variety of tourism initiatives in WMAs, 
including campsites, tented lodges and game drives among others. However, these 
regulations do not allow WMAs to make any agreements relating to consumptive use of 
wildlife (specifically, the allocation of hunting blocks) (Section VIII, 43 (1)). The guidelines 
are also specific in terms of revenue sharing among the four government institutions that 
have stake in WMAs. For instance, the division of revenues generated from tourist and 
resident hunting between the Wildlife Division2 (now T, Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund 
(TWPF) Treasury, District Council and the WMA is as follows: (see Table 1).   
 
 
 
 
																																																						
2	Tanzania Wildlife Authority (TAWA)	
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Table 2: Division of revenue generated from tourist hunting activities in the WMA 
 
s/n Fee’s type TWPF  WMA  District Council  Treasury  
1 Block fee 25% 75% 0 0 
2 Game fee 25% 45% 15% 15% 
3 Conservation fee 25% 45% 0 30% 
4 Observers fee 25% 45% 0 30% 
5 Permit fee 25% 15% 0 60% 
Source: URT (2012) WMAs Regulations; pp. 65  
 
In the case of hunting practices as presented in Table 2, the AA consortium advertises 
hunting blocks in WMAs. However, before negotiating with potential investors, individual 
AAs are required to obtain the advice of the District Natural Resources Advisory Board 
and the proposed investors are also subject to approval by the Director of Wildlife. The 
reviewed regulations on non-consumptive tourism (2008) as well as the WMA regulations 
(2012) require that after the investors are identified by AAs, they deal directly with the 
Wildlife Division (currently the Tanzania Wildlife Authority (TAWA) after recent changes 
in wildlife administration) in all matters related to payment of fees and other requirements 
stipulated in different pieces of legislation.  
 
In the case of photographic tourism, the regulation requires WMA to spend its total 
allocation of tourism revenue (which is 65% of total) in the following manner: no less than 
15% shall be re-invested in resource development; no less than 50% shall be directed to 
member villages forming the WMA; and no less than 25% shall be used to strengthen the 
Authorized Association (AA).The AAs can use the remaining 10% as they deem fit – most 
of them invest in community development projects as opposed to investing in tourism-
related business to regenerate profit. In the following section, we discuss the impact of 
these formulas on local community welfare. 
 
 
7.Power, politics and the livelihood outcomes of WMAs 
 
The politics of control and the impact of WMAs on livelihoods have been critically 
reviewed by many studies in Tanzania. Our review categorizes this literature around two 
broad themes: recentralization through decentralization; and prioritization of private 
investments over local community needs. 
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7.1 Recentralization through decentralization 
 
As the government of Tanzania re-regulated activities in WMAs through its revised 
wildlife policy (2007), Wildlife Act (2009) and WMA regulations (2012), all tourist 
transactions were required to be channelled through the Wildlife Division (URT, 2007; 
2012). These new laws foreclosed most opportunities that villages had enjoyed in relation 
to their direct engagement with private enterprises. The literature documents that the 
Wildlife Division has developed a command and control system that favours selected 
groups of hunting outfitters and has reduced income generation in rural communities 
who are the legitimate hunting holders of the land (Nshala, 1999, Baldus and Cauldwell, 
2004). Other studies suggest that the system of revenue flow from tourists via private 
companies to the Wildlife Division is generally not known to the various actors who take 
part in the transactions, due to low levels of transparency coupled with corruption in the 
revenue collection and allocation system (Mariki et al., 2015, Bluwstein and Lund, 2016, 
Moyo et al., 2016). 
 
The government control of revenue collection and allocation has caused resistance 
among outfitters to accept the WMA concept and effectively empower local communities. 
These outfitters have been more willing to deliver hand-outs to villagers than promoting 
productive cooperation with communities (Nshala, 1999). Against this background, critics 
have suggested that WMAs and tourism investments that are fostered within them are 
inherently territorial (Bluwstein and Lund, 2016, Bluwstein, 2017) and represent a form of 
green grabbing (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012, Green and Adams, 2015). The 
process that establishes these WMAs necessitates convergence of interests and funds 
from powerful global actors who engage actively in the re-organization of local space 
hence constraining local community choices for the use of land due to the prioritization 
of wildlife protection. 
 
7.2 Prioritization of private investments over local community needs 
 
The current official status of WMA was captured by WWF in 2014 (WWF, 2014). The report 
describes WMAs as ‘high-value industries with strong markets that rely on wildlife 
conservation’ (WWF, 2014: 17). This is despite the acknowledgement in the same report 
that most WMAs have negligible tourism revenue or none at all. While these low revenues 
are invested in community development (e.g. education, infrastructure and health 
facilities), WMAs do not necessarily know how much money they should receive. This lack 
of transparency makes it impossible for communities to demand a fair portion of benefits 
(WWF, 2014). Accordingly, Funk (2015) examined tourism and its potentials to improve 
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livelihoods in Burunge WMA and found that revenues generated through tourism 
activities are substantial. Yet, the distribution and use of those financial resources do not 
allow villagers to be compensated for costs created by restricted resource access and 
human-wildlife-conflicts. Elsewhere in the country, villagers are increasingly becoming 
impatient with the lack of social benefits to individual households and even community 
(Noe and Kangalawe, 2015, PIMA, 2015, Moyo et al., 2016). Although it is not clear if food 
insecurity has increased, WMAs have exacerbated the intensity of human-wildlife conflict 
(Kapande, 2015). Damage is increasingly inflicted on crops, home-based food storage 
facilities, and water sources, while homes are raided causing loss of livestock as well as 
injuries and deaths of humans across the country (Vedeld et al., 2012, Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 2015, Mariki 
et al., 2015). 
 
Our discussion so far covered work on the recent dynamics in the wildlife sector in 
Tanzania generally, and on tourism development in WMAs. However, the question of the 
livelihood impacts of tourism has also been examined in academic studies (Nelson, 2010; 
Spenceley and Snyman, 2017; van der Duim et al., 2014) as well as impact and evaluation 
studies commissioned by the international donors supporting tourism partnerships  
(Elliot and Sumba, 2010). The conclusions of these studies are mixed, but what is 
generally clear is that community benefits from tourism are directly related to the share 
of revenue they receive from different partnership agreements and the additional income 
generated from providing ancillary services to tourism arrangements (as staff at eco-
lodges, tour guides, etc.). Even when part of tourism revenues is received for community 
use and invested in building and maintaining schools, health clinics and other needed 
amenities, it is assumed that social and economic benefits are spread across community 
members (Elliot & Sumba., 2010; Lamers, Nthiga, van der Duim, & van Wijk, 2014; 
Mbaiwa & Stronza, 2010). Yet, corruption and local elites have often become the source 
of frustration for blocking the possible trickle-down effects of tourism (Mbilinyi et al., 
2012). This has become a source of concern, as local community members continue to 
pursue their traditional livelihood activities with high level ecological stress despite the 
promise of conservation tourism (Burgoyne & Mearns, 2016). Indeed, community 
members have continued to practice farming as their main livelihood activity even when 
they have released large part of their land for developing tourism through WMAs. For 
this reason, wildlife in WMAs and village lands continues to compete with farming, hence 
causing frustration and despair for the loss of crops and increased food and other 
livelihood insecurities.   
 
 
NEPSUS Working Paper 2017/3 19 
8. Ecological sustainability  
The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania (2007) acknowledges that the wildlife sector is facing a 
number of problems, including persistent illegal harvesting of wildlife, low staff morale, 
limited human resources to carry out conservation activities, and low budgetary allocation 
for wildlife conservation at local government level (URT, 2007). As in many other African 
countries, these constraints are associated with the increased incidence of poaching in 
Tanzania, despite the heightened effort to develop community-based conservation in the 
past three decades. 
 
In 2014, the Poverty and ecosystem service Impacts of Tanzania’s Wildlife Management 
Areas (PIMA) provided anassessment of the ecological and social-economic viability of 
WMAs. The project focused on benefits, costs, and their distribution between state, 
community and households. PIMA collected household-level information on wealth and 
livelihoods through surveys and wealth ranking exercises, supplemented with WMA- and 
village-level information on WMA governance, including revenue distribution. This 
information was gathered in 42 villages, both inside and outside six WMA areas, in 
Northern and Southern Tanzania (Homewood et al., 2015). The PIMA project combined 
socio-economic data with aerial surveys that were conducted in collaboration with 
TAWIRI, focusing mainly on WMAs. The analysis of aerial counts of wildlife population in 
the WMAs suggests that elephant carcasses counted in WMAs such as Makame (Longido 
district) and Liwale (Lindi district) exceeded live elephants spotted in those areas (Burgess 
et al., 2015). Although the study did not establish the cause of these deaths and the age 
of the carcasses, the timing of the survey was at the height of the poaching crisis in the 
country, with DNA evidence locating many seized tusks as coming from the Selous game 
reserve. 
WWF (2016) suggests that WMAs have been an effective means of expanding area 
coverage for conservation beyond protected areas. The 17 WMAs that have either been 
registered or are in the advanced stage of registration represent land set aside for wildlife 
amounting to over 28,389 km2 (WWF, 2014). This means that about three percent of 
village land that lies outside other kinds of protected areas has been secured for wildlife 
protection.3 Yet, WMA governance has also created conditions for further threats to 
wildlife because this expansion is associated with the extension of state control over 
village land rather than empowerment of local communities (Burgess et al., 2015, 
Homewood et al., 2015, Mariki et al., 2015, Wright, 2017). Most of local livelihood 
activities, including agriculture and grazing, have in part or fully been foreclosed resulting 
																																																						
3 This percentage differs from the one reported in CITES (2016), which indicates 5%. This is most likely because it combines areas 
in WMAs and the Game Controlled Areas. 
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into conflicts and various kinds of livelihood impacts in the local communities (Bluwstein 
and Lund, 2016, Moyo et al., 2016). Wildlife protection and human livelihoods are 
therefore undermined by a combination of legal constraints of access and lack of 
compensation for loss, which create different kinds of local livelihood insecurities.  
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Through a review of the relevant literature, this paper has documented how partnerships 
for wildlife protection have emerged in the specific context of Tanzania, and the 
ecological and socio-economic impacts that these partnership shave had on ecosystems 
and communities. By highlighting the influence of specific global actors, including 
bilateral and development partners, the paper demonstrates how recent reforms in the 
wildlife sector created the conditions for partnerships to emerge. In our previous working 
paper, we suggested that conservation partnerships are tied to major global processes 
of scale construction, the creation of hybrid governance and the marketization of wildlife, 
which determine how biodiversity should be protected, governed and utilized (Noe et al., 
2017a). The current paper provides a specific case of the ‘crisis’ narrative applied to the 
case of the Selous game reserve, and the subsequent protection efforts of an ecosystem 
that is currently the largest in size and among the best tourist destinations in Africa. These 
narratives inform global and national policies that formalize marketization of nature, 
hence calling for a diversity of actors.  
 
We suggest that partnerships have emerged out of different processes that influence the 
convergence of interests of powerful actors whose actions meet on the ground, with 
various implications for both biodiversity and local livelihoods. In the case of Tanzania’s 
wildlife sector, partnerships have flourished and led to the establishment of WMAs as a 
focus for tourism enterprises. However, our review suggests that these partnerships are 
yet to have tangible impacts in on wildlife protection and local livelihoods. By becoming 
conservation partners, village councils have indeed contributed significantly to the 
expansion of wildlife-protected areas. Nevertheless, local livelihood strategies continue 
to be constrained by limited benefits due to tendencies of recentralization, the 
appropriation strategies of local elites, corruption and increasing limitations on land use. 
Greater community tolerance towards wildlife, and elephants in particular, can only be 
associated with the benefits arising from hunting and strong process-oriented 
commitments to community-based conservation, which is currently missing (CITES, 2015). 
 
NEPSUS Working Paper 2017/3 21 
The paper contributes to the understanding of how wildlife protection partnerships in 
Tanzania have emerged over the years. It provides an important knowledge base on the 
country’s experience in fostering different forms and configurations of wildlife protection 
partnerships generally and within the specific context of the Selous ecosystem and its 
surroundings. Our research thus contributes to the understanding of how these new 
partnerships are evolving overtime and more specifically, how villagers are coping with 
the changing meanings and institutions governing resources in their village lands, the 
emerging models of benefit and cost sharing and the ways in which conservation and 
livelihood outcomes are interpreted by different actors.  
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Appendix 1: Tanzania’s legal and policy framework on wildlife conservation  
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URT	Constitution	(1977)	as	
amended
ENVIRONMEN
TAL	LAWS
Environmental	Management	Act	
20	of	2004
CONSERVATIO
N	LAWS
Wildlife	Conservation	Act	No.	5	
of	2009	
WMA	Regulations,	GN	206	of	
2012
Wildlife	Conservation	(Non-
Consumptive	Wildlife	Utilization)	
Regulations,	GN	357	of	2008
Wildlife	Conservation	(Tourist	
Hunting)	Regulations,	GN	229	
of	2010
Wildlife	Conservation	(Non-
Consumptive	Wildlife	Utilization)	
Regulations	2016	GN	No	181	
Ngorongoro	Conservation	Area	
Act	(CAP	284	R.E.	2002)
Water	Resources	Management	
Act	No	11	of	2009
Fisheries	Act	No.	22	of	2002	
(CAP	279	R.E.	2002)
Forest	Act	No.	14	of	2002
Beekeeping	Act	No	15	2002
Tanzania	National	Parks	Act	
(CAP	282	R.E.	2002)
The	Marine	Parks	and	
Reserves	Act,	No	29	of	1994
LAND	&	LAND	
USE	LAWS
Land	Act,	No	4	of	1999 Land	Regulations	2001
Village	Land	Act,	No	5	of	1999 Village	Land	Regulations	GN.	86	of	2001
Land	Use	Planning	Act		No	6	
of	2007
TOURISM		&	
INVESTMENT	
LAWS
Tourism	Act	No.	29	of	2008
Tanzania	Investment	Act	No.	
26	of	1997
RESEARCH	&	
TRAINIG	
INSTITUTIONS
Tanzania	Wildlife	Research	Institute	No.	4	
of	1980	&	No	10	of	1999
College	of	African	Wildlife	Management	
(MWEKA)	Act	No	8	1964	CAP	R.E.2002)
Tanzania	Forest	Research	
Institute	Act	(CAP	277	R.E.	
2002)Tanzania	Fisheries	Research	
Institute	Act	(CAP	280	R.E.	
2002)
LOCAL	
GOVERNMENT	
LAWS
The	Local	Government	
(District)	Authorities	Act,	No	7	
of	1982
The	Local	Government	(Urban	
Authorities)	Act,	No.	8	of	1982
PROCECUTION	
OF	OFFENDERS
Economic	and	Organized	Crime	
Control	Act,	Cap	200
